All Sides
American partisans vastly under-estimate the diversity of other partisans’ policy attitudes
Nicholas Dias, Yphtach Lelkes & Jacob Pearl
Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming
Abstract:
A popular explanation for America's democratic ills is that Republicans and Democrats misperceive one another to hold extreme attitudes. However, Americans may also misperceive the diversity of partisans’ attitudes to ill effect. This paper uses surveys and pre-registered experiments with representative and convenience samples (n = 9405) to validate a measure of perceived attitude extremity and diversity and compare it to canonical measures of perceived polarization. We find that American partisans vastly under-estimate the diversity of each party's attitudes. Yet, contrary to existing research, we see little evidence that partisans over-estimate how extreme the “average” Republican or Democrat is. Finally, perceptions of both the “average” partisan and within-party attitude diversity predict partisan animosity and perceptions of out-party threat.
Left–right political orientations are not systematically related to conspiracism
Adam Enders et al.
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Researchers have long sought to make generalizable conclusions about the relationship between conspiracism and political identities. However, this literature remains deeply conflicted. The “extremity hypothesis” argues that, due to the psychology of extremism, individuals who identify as extremely left or right wing should display higher levels of conspiracism than centrists. But the “asymmetry hypothesis” argues that, due to the psychology of conservatism, individuals who self-identify as right wing should display higher levels of conspiracism than those identifying as centrists or left wing. Here, we attempt to reconcile these competing hypotheses and the empirical findings supporting them. First, we demonstrate that the inconsistent findings stem from research designs that cannot support generalizable conclusions about the relationship between conspiracism and political identities. Second, we reexamine the most prominent studies supporting the extremity and asymmetry hypotheses. We find that they suffer from inappropriate measurement and modeling strategies, rendering their conclusions suspect. We then test the extremity and asymmetry hypotheses by reexamining 18 U.S. surveys (2012–21; n = 32,056) and examining new surveys from 18 countries (2022; n = 18,033). In total, our 77 samples spanning a decade and 27 countries (n = 161,492) provide only weak support for either hypothesis. The wide variability in our findings suggests that differences in the relationship between conspiracism and political identities across political and temporal contexts do not stem from sampling variability, but rather from systematic forces that impact ideology, conspiracism, or both. We conclude that there is no single functional form that universally characterizes the relationship between conspiracism and political orientations across countries, or even over time within countries.
Cognitive Ability, but Not Cognitive Reflection, Predicts Expressing Greater Political Animosity and Favouritism
Abigail Cassario et al.
British Journal of Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Liberals and conservatives both express political animosity and favouritism. However, less is known about whether the same or different factors contribute to this phenomenon among liberals and conservatives. We test three different relationships that could emerge between cognitive ability and cognitive reflection, and political group-based attitudes. Analyzing two nationally representative surveys of US Americans (N= 9,035) containing a measure of cognitive ability, we find evidence that compared to people lower in cognitive ability, people higher in cognitive ability express more animosity towards ideologically discordant groups, and more favouritism towards ideologically concordant groups. This pattern was particularly pronounced among liberals. In a registered report study, we then test whether the same is true of cognitive reflection in another large dataset (N = 3,498). In contrast to cognitive ability, we find no relationship between cognitive reflection and political animosity and favouritism. Together, these studies provide a comprehensive test of how cognitive ability and cognitive reflection are related to political animosity and favouritism for liberals and conservatives in the United States.
Origin of (A)symmetry: The Evolution of Out-Party Distrust in the United States
Bouke Klein Teeselink & Georgios Melios
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Partisans tend to be skeptical of governments only when they are led by the other side. This president-in-power effect threatens democratic functioning by limiting partisans’ ability to hold their own party accountable. As polarization rises, the problems associated with this phenomenon are likely to aggravate. This paper examines the evolution and drivers of the president-in-power effect since 1974. Mirroring the general rise in polarization, we document a steady increase in the president-in-power effect. Our research demonstrates that this increase can be attributed to an intensification of partisan identification, combined with a growing perceived ideological distance towards the opposed party. Contrasting the narrative that polarization is stronger on the right, however, we find evidence that the president-in-power effect has grown faster for Democrats than for Republicans. To explain this pattern, we show that highly educated people, who display a stronger president-in-power effect, have shifted towards the left in recent years.
Unfollowing hyperpartisan social media influencers durably reduces out-party animosity
Steve Rathje et al.
NYU Working Paper, October 2024
Abstract:
There is considerable debate over whether and how social media contributes to polarization. In a correlational study (n1 = 1,447) and two digital field experiments (n2 = 494, n3 = 1,133), we examined whether (un)following hyperpartisan social media influencers contributes to polarization and misinformation sharing. We found that incentivizing Twitter/X users to unfollow hyperpartisan social media influencers improved feelings toward the out-party by 23.5% compared to the control group, with effects persisting for at least six months. Unfollowing also led participants to engage with more accurate news and increased satisfaction with their Twitter/X feeds -- without reducing engagement. This study demonstrates the long-term causal impact of exposure to hyperpartisan influencers. Moreover, unlike other social media reduction interventions, unfollowing is a targeted approach: like a scalpel, it surgically removes a few harmful parts of one’s feed, allowing the beneficial aspects to remain.
Polarization versus professionalism: Military and civilian views on the domestic use of the military
Kolby Hanson & Austin Knuppe
Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming
Abstract:
Scholars and policymakers warn that with rising affective polarization, politicians will find support from the public and permission from military professionals to use military force to selectively crack down on political opponents. We test these claims by conducting parallel survey experiments among the US public and mid-career military officers. We ask about two hypothetical scenarios of domestic partisan unrest, randomly assigning the partisan identity of protesters. Surprisingly, we find widespread public support for deploying the military and no significant partisanship effects. Meanwhile, military officers were very resistant to deploying the military, with nearly 75 percent opposed in any scenario. In short, there is little evidence that public polarization threatens to escalate domestic disputes, and strong evidence for military opposition.
Spirited away: Access to alcohol and support for the populist radical right
Zeth Isaksson
Electoral Studies, October 2024
Abstract:
Does the availability of alcohol influence support for radical right-wing parties, and if so, why? Drawing parallels to the UK, where pub closures led to increased support for UKIP, this study investigates similar trends observed in Sweden. Utilizing a novel dataset of over 50,000 alcohol-serving permits and electoral data from 2002 to 2018, the study finds that a reduction in permits is associated with a 3.7% increase in support for the Sweden Democrats (SD). To explain this, it is argued that bar closures politicize alcohol regulation and serve as a symbolic issue linked to the populist radical right. Survey data from over 20,000 respondents reveal that individuals in municipalities with a decreasing number of permits are more likely to support alcohol deregulation policies, and these voters become more likely to support SD. These findings underscore how perceptions of government overregulation drive support for radical right-wing parties.
Not ready to make nice: Congressional candidates’ emotional appeals on Twitter
Annelise Russell, Heather Evans & Bryan Gervais
Social Science Quarterly, September 2024, Pages 1848-1856
Method: Using a data set of tweets by candidates for the U.S. House from 2016 to 2022, we highlight the escalating anger in the emotional appeals candidates make on Twitter and the resiliency of angry rhetoric as a modern feature of political Twitter.
Results: We find that women, most notably Democratic candidates, are more likely to convey angry emotions on Twitter, not only matching male colleagues but defying gendered social stereotypes to turn frustration into a valuable political asset. Across the four last congressional elections, women have averaged more angry words in their digital appeals, with that anger as a consistent facet of how women engage online. Women are leaning into angry emotional appeals and adopting a negative appeal in their digital engagement that highlights their policy and political frustrations for voters.
Partisan Conversion Through Neighborhood Influence: How Voters Adopt the Partisanship of their Neighbors
Jacob Brown
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Recent studies show that American neighborhoods have become politically homogeneous, raising concerns about how geographic polarization divides parties and influences voters. But it remains unclear how voters are influenced by the politics of their neighbors. I argue that voters are influenced by local norms when defining their own partisan affiliations, adopting local partisanship. Panel data on 41 million voters from 2008-2020 and an original survey of 24,433 respondents demonstrate that exposure to partisan neighbors increases party switching. These effects are largest for older voters, voters in single-family communities, and voters with more same-race neighbors. Survey data support mechanisms of social influence: voters accurately perceive local partisanship, interact more with partisans they live near, and are more comfortable when their partisanship matches neighbors’ political affiliations. Partisanship is thus shaped by where voters live and who they live close to, demonstrating the behavioral consequences of geographic polarization.